

DOC 1632 A

Excerpt from Marquis Kido's Diary

1931

July 11 (Sat) - On the way home about 10 o'clock, I visited Mr. HARADA at his home. Heard the information that the Army during the past week had stiffened its attitude in regard to the reduction of the armaments and especially in regards to economizing which is the latest plan of the Finance Department. We are worried that the Army as a last resort might take further steps to appeal to the throne.

1931

July 13 (Monday) — At noon, had lunch with Messrs. HARADA, TAKAGI, SAKAI and OKABE at Tokyo Club. Mr. HARADA reported to us that the Army was more unyielding than ever and that the War Minister is going to see the Emperor on the 14th or 15th. I thought that I should report this matter to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, and left Shinbashi at 2:25 for Kamakura to relay this message. Ordered to relay this message to the Grand Chamberlain in Hayama, I immediately left by automobile and called on the Grand Chamberlain SUZUKI at Chojaen. I relayed to him the message and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal's view in regard to it and came home at 6:30.

1931

September 9 (Wednesday) - At 6:30 P.M., held a conference in respect of the present aspect of affairs, at the residence of Prince KONOYE, including the prince, ARIMA, OKAWA and myself. Mostly, ARIMA explained in details about the secret plot which had been planned by a certain group of militarists and the OKAWA's faction in the middle part of last March, by such connection as he had been requested to participate in executing the plot by OKAWA, Shumei through SHIMIZU.

"ARIMA. 'This plot has been suspended once. However, a thought of this kind will not disappear altogether, but will reappear whenever an opportunity presents itself, because the motives of planning this plot were

(1) that the permeation of Communism has been so noticeable recently that this country might fall into Communists' hands if the agitation was left unchecked.

(2) No movement will attain its object, unless it is carried out under the Imperial rule.

(3) Wherefore, the OKAWA's faction advocates Socialistic Nationalism under the Imperial rule and the establishment of an Autocratic government in place of the present political party system.

(4) A certain militarists' group has responded to this and shook hands with the OKAWA's faction for the purpose of creating such a Fascists' government as existing in Italy.' "

In view of the above reasons, we shall have to think up an adequate counter-measure. Especially, the Imperial Household should have full understanding of the situation and take necessary steps about it. We found the point of agreement in our opinions, and we arranged that we meet and discuss this matter as frequently as possible.

Document No. 1632-E

Excerpt from the Diary of Marquis KIDO

1931

September 12 (Sat.) -- At noon I met Mr. HARADA at Ginza Dining Hall and talked in detail about the latest under-handed movement of the Army.

1931

September 10 (Thurs.) -- Had lunch with Mr. OKABE, Mr. ODA and Mr. TANI, the head of the Asiatic Bureau, at Prince KONOYE's house. Mr. TANI told us about the China Affairs and gave his opinion. His opinion was that self defensive action might be unavoidable according to developments in the future. I agree with it, in general.

1931.

August 7 (Fri.) -- Came to Tokyo by electric car starting at 8.19 and went to see Mr. HARADA. I learned about the latest political conditions and especially of the plot to be carried out in Army circles during the middle of March. It is regrettable from the standpoint of control of our country that it is becoming very obvious that the Army will carry out a certain type of plot.

1. During the middle of March when the Parliamentary session was being held a plan was drafted at the official residence of War Minister to disrupt the Parliamentary session and bring about the political change by Major Generals KOISO, TATEKAWA and NINOMIYA as leaders with Lt. Cols. HASHIMOTO and SHIGEFUJI who would act at their beck and call. OKAWA, Shunsei, stood between them, collaborating with Social Mass Party. They planned to send Lt. Col. SUZUKI to MORI of the SEIYUKAI party, conveying their plot confidentially. This was given up, however, by the advice of SUZUKI, who (entertained fears) for the sake of the Army. It could be guessed that UGAKI was at the back of the plot.

2. An association of research group of Manchurian and Mongolian questions was formed among a group of captains graduated recently from the Army Staff College and the above-mentioned Lt. Colonels HASHIMOTO and SHIGEFUJI were its backers.

3. The brains of the Army cannot check these kind of associations because they themselves planned such plots as mentioned above.

4. Recently the Army group has been getting very strong. There is a danger of strong antagonism between the civilians and the Army regarding drafting of the budget.

1931.

August 7 (Fri.) -- Came to Tokyo by electric car starting at 8.19 and went to see Mr. HARADA. I learned about the latest political conditions and especially of the plot to be carried out in Army circles during the middle of March. It is regrettable from the standpoint of control of our country that it is becoming very obvious that the Army will carry out a certain type of plot.

1. During the middle of March when the Parliamentary session was being held a plan was drafted at the official residence of War Minister to disrupt the Parliamentary session and bring about the political change by Major Generals KOISO, TATEKAWA and NINOMIYA as leaders with Lt. Cols. HASHIMOTO and SHIGEFUJI who would act at their back and call. OKAWA, Shumei, stood between them, collaborating with Social Mass Party. They planned to send Lt. Col. SUZUKI to MORI of the SEIYUKAI party, conveying their plot confidentially. This was given up, however, by the advice of SUZUKI, who (entertained fears) for the sake of the Army. It could be guessed that UGAKI was at the back of the plot.

2. An association of research group of Manchurian and Mongolian questions was formed among a group of captains graduated recently from the Army Staff College and the above-mentioned Lt. Colonels HASHIMOTO and SHIGEFUJI were its backers.

3. The brains of the Army cannot check these kind of associations because they themselves planned such plots as mentioned above.

4. Recently the Army group has been getting very strong. There is a danger of strong antagonism between the civilians and the Army regarding drafting of the budget.

1931

August 12. (Wed.) -- 6 o'clock in the afternoon, I went to Baron HARADA's house. Had dinner with Prince KONOYE and Marquis INOUE. We heard and studied the details of what Mr. HARADA had told me the other day about the under-handed activities of a section of the Army. The affair that made Mr. UGAKI the leader, was that of March 20. (x) certain SHIMIZU of Taikosha was supplied with thirty bombs (Those were only for use in maneuvers and were almost harmless). However, it was told that the bombs were taken back to the Army a month ago. It is a fact that because the plot was called off and to pay off the men that had been assembled, they collected ¥ 100,000 from among the Tokugawa nobles.

(x) The above-mentioned fact centering around Ugaki as the leader, is in regard to the occurrence of about March 20, when a certain -----

1931

Sept. 19 - At 1.30 the Prime Minister went to see the Emperor. I was told that our Army would not try to enlarge the situation but would stop any further action when it found itself in an advantageous position.

A telephone call came from Mr. HARADA telling me to meet at the official residence of the Minister of the Imperial Household, at 8.30.

The Minister of the Imperial Household, the Grand Chamberlain and Mr. HARADA were there. Mr. HARADA reported that he was called by the Prime Minister at about 6.30 and that he was asked about the state of affairs. He said that the Army's attitude was very strong. He added that in regard to the policies decided upon by the cabinet, the Premier seemed to be worrying because the Army was not driving it home thoroughly. The Premier, therefore, wanted to find the best way for controlling the Army. Some said that it might be best to ask for Prince KAN-IN's help, and the others said that they should ask the "GENRO" to stay in Tokyo. But I told them that the Premier should not depend on others in the solution of this situation at this critical time. I emphasized that there was no other alternative but for the cabinet to hold meetings repeatedly and for days, even if futile, and to indicate a firm opinion of its own for the unification of national opinion.

1931

September 23 (Wed.) -- At 2.00 p.m., attended tea party thrown for Gentlemen of the Press at KASUMIYAMA Club. Heard the course of events in the Manchurian Incident from HAYASHI, the head of Maintenance Bureau of the Department of War. However, as the cause of the railway explosion, the most important point of the whole affair was not explained clearly, I asked him the question. To this, he replied that he had not as yet received the report. It seems very strange to me. It is regrettable also, not to be posted and informed on this point, especially when people are talking with skepticism about the cause of this accident.

1931

Sept. 29 (Tues.) -- At 9 o'clock, I visited the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal at his official residence and reported what I had heard from HARADA last night; namely, what the Chief of the Army General Staff had told to the Premier, "Chances are the Army is compelled to send troops to the Yangtze River area. If this happens, he does not want the trouble regarding the reversion of Supreme Command--that is to say, the Government shall not interfere with the prerogative of the Supreme Command of the Army."

1931

Oct. 1 (Thurs.) -- At 4 o'clock, I visited Mr. HARADA. Also present were Prince KONOYE and Mr. SHIRATORI. We discussed and consulted upon the militarist's secret plot. The combination of the middle class elements of the Army is likely to be pretty tight, and the plan to break down the present political party system by means of effecting coup-d'etat and to administer national affairs under dictatorship has been made secretly ever since the 2nd year of Showa era (1927). This is a serious problem indeed! It will be impossible for our statesmen and politicians to realize the danger of such a problem. It is very difficult to devise a counter measure. Anyway, it will be necessary to guide those militarists so that they won't cause the nation a serious damage and unnecessary sacrifice. It is a national calamity.

1931

Oct. 5 (Mon.) -- At 4.30 I visited Minister of the Imperial Household ICHIKI, at his official residence with Prince KONOYE. We discussed the Army's stubbornness and its intrigues. We gave him all information available and asked him to think up the best solution to this matter.

Document No. 1632-0

Excerpt from Marquis Kido's Diary.

1931

Oct. 6 (Tues.) -- The Prime Minister seemed to have talked about the serious situation to the Lord Keeper. The thing worrying the Prime Minister is that there is a risk of head-on collision with the Army about the question of the other party with whom to negotiate the Manchurian problem.

1931

Oct. 7 (Wed.) -- at 7 p. m. HARADA came to my house and we went to see Marquis INOUE at Uchidayama. We heard the opinions of the current problem of the Army Department from Lt. Colonel SUZUKI. Activities, in which Lt. Colonel SUZUKI takes part do not intend to carry out the national reformation immediately, but it is to save the situation if something does happen in the future, such as the outbreak of rebellion among the young officers. On the way home, I reported to Prince KONOYE about the above matter.

1931

October 15 (Thurs.) -- At 1.30, I attended a tea party of the managing staffs of the newspapers. The Chief of the Information, SHIRATORI, Chief of the Maintenance Bureau, HAYASHI, and I had a conference on the situation.

HAYASHI, upon a premise that it was his own assumption, gave the following statement:

"It will be unwise to take time in solving the Manchurian question, from the Army's point of view in governing disciplines. It requires prompt solution. In order to reach prompt solution, it will be necessary to create a new regime in Manchuria. If the Central Authorities should give the agitators of the movement a tacit approval to do so, it will facilitate the solution of the problem."

He indicated by his statement the fact that the militarists still stuck to its plan to establish a new regime in Manchuria. On the other hand, it is said that the attitude of the militarists suddenly stiffened, taking advantage of the rumor that Count UCHIDA, the President of South Manchuria Railway Company, had the intention to settle the pending question by one effort--the establishment of a new regime in Manchuria.

Document No. 1632-V

Excerpt from Marquis Kido's Diary.

1931

September 21 (Mon.) -- At 9.30 I went to the office. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal came to Tokyo last night. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, the Grand Chamberlain and Vice-Grand Chamberlain, the head of the Army Aide-de-camp and I gathered in the room of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and conferred about the China and Manchukuo conflict.

Baron HARADA telephoned me from Kyoto asking if there were any further developments in the situation, and suggested that if the Emperor were to call Prince KAN-IN, we would discuss thoroughly the Prince's answer to the Emperor. HARADA 'phoned me again that evening. He transmitted Prince SAIONJI's words to be cautious about his (KANAYA) answer when KANAYA, the Chief of the General Staff would go to see the Emperor to explain why the Korean Army had advanced into Manchukuo without the Emperor's sanction.

At 7.30 p.m. after dinner, I visited the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal at his official residence and transmitted HARADA's telephonic message. On my way home, I stopped at TAKEUCHI's house. But I could not see him, as he was on a business trip.

Exo. 199-A

Dec 1632 H!

木戸公日記(昭和六年)より抜萃

1931

七月十日

帰途十時頃原田君ヲ其宅ニ訪フ

軍縮問題殊ニ最近、大藏省立派、節約問題、

July
ニ関連シ陸軍方面此週同以來ニ分ニ硬化セリト、情
報ヲ聴ク、軍部北有米、陣ヲ構ヘ上奏方、手段ニお
ニテフズト憂慮セラル。

木戸侯日記(昭和六年)ヨリ抜粋

乙午東京俱樂部ニテ原田、高木、酒井、岡部
 一諸君ト会食ス。原田君ヨリ軍部、情報
 依然トシテ硬化セル目ヲ聴キ十四、五日頃陸軍
 大臣拜謁ヲ奏請セリト、コト故直ニ大臣
 ニ報告スル一西遊アリト曰ヒ一旦歸定ノ上二時
 二十五分新橋駅ニテ鎌倉ニ大臣ヲ訪ヒ情
 報ヲ傳フ。其結果大臣ノ命ニヨリ葉山ニ
 於ケル侍従長ニ傳フルト、ナリ。直ニ自衛軍
 ニテ葉山ニナリ、長春園ニ鈴木侍従長ヲ訪
 問。情報並ニヤニ對シ内大臣ノ意見ヲ傳フ。
 六時半歸京

Ex. 178-B

July 13 - 1731 / 632 B

木中候月記(昭和十一年)三月抄

Sept 9 - 1931 / 632 D

Ex. 179-2

[illegible]

Document No. 1632-E

EXH. 177-~~11~~ D

Excerpt from the Diary of Marquis KIDO

1931

September 12 (Sat.) -- At noon I met Mr. HARADA at Ginza Dining Hall and talked in detail about the latest under-handed movement of the Army.

Ly. 179-Q

1632 E

Sept 12-1931

九月十二日

正午銀座食堂ニ于原田ト會食

軍部、近時、策動 振り！羊腿談入

EX-117-WE

41

Document No. 1632-F

Excerpt from Marquis Kido's Diary

1931

September 10 (Thurs.) -- Had lunch with Mr. OKADA, Mr. ODA and Mr. TANI, the head of the Asiatic Bureau, at Prince KONOYE's house. Mr. TANI told us about the China Affairs and gave his opinion. His opinion was that self defensive action might be unavoidable according to developments in the future. I agree with it, in general.

Mr. 179-E

Sept 10-1931 1632F

木下侯日記(昭和五十年)より抜粋

正午近衛卿ニテ國部藏大臣並に合子
局長ト合會シ合子ヨリ對支問題ニツキ実情
並ニ之ニ對シ意見ヲ聽ク場合ニヨリテ自衛
権、要務ヲ敢テ陳₁₆₃₁ケル同氏、意見ニハ大体
賛成ナリ

6179-15

Doc. 1632 W.G.

Aug. 7-1931

不才公日記（昭和六年より抜粋）

午前八時、九分電、電車より上京、直々ニ原田君ヲ自宅ニ訪問。最近、政情殊ニ云々、三月中旬頃、軍部方面ニ發行ハル策謀ニ就テ大体九ノ如キ事實ヲ聽ク。近來軍部ノ一種ノ策動ヲ行フコト、顯著トナリ、ワパールハ國家ノ統制上ヨリ見ルモ遺憾ナリ。

一、三月中旬議會開會中、陸軍大臣官舎ニ於テト磯建リニ官少將ヲ中心ニ橋本重藤、兩中佐、其手足ナリ、大川周明、其間ニ介在シ、大衆黨ト結ビ議會ヲ混亂ニ陷レ、政變ヲ來サントスル計畫ヲナシ、鈴木中佐ヲシテ政友會ノ森氏、其同意ヲ通セシメントセシ、同中佐ノ國軍ノ爲ノ諫止ニヨリ漸ク中止レタリトノ事實、

宇垣陸相モ其背後ニアリシモノト推セラル

一、最近陸軍大體ノナキ業、大尉ヲ中心トシ、滿蒙問題ニ研究、結社ニ前記橋本重藤、兩中佐、其裏面ニアリ

一、前記策動等ナシ、名關係上陸軍主腦部ハ此ノ種ノ結社等ヲ押スルヲ能ハズ

一、最近陸軍ノ結束ハ益々強固トナリ、ワパールニ算編成ヲ中心トシ、文武、對立ヲ激シ、スルノ虞アリ

(Corrected copy)

Exhibit No. 179 F

Document No. 1632-G

Excerpt from Marquis Kido's Diary

1931.

August 7 (Fri.) -- Immediately upon arrival at Tokyo by the 8:19 a.m. electric car I called at Mr. Harada's residence. I learned about the following facts concerning the latest political conditions and especially of the plot that was to be carried out by military circles sometime during the middle of last March. It is regrettable from the standpoint of control of our nation that recently it is becoming very noticeable that the army makes certain types of plots.

1. During the middle of March when the Parliamentary session was being held a plan was drafted at the official residence of War Minister to disrupt the Parliamentary session and bring about the political change by Major Generals KOISO, TATEKAWA and NINOMIYA as leaders with Lt. Cols. HASHIMOTO and SHIGEFUJI who would act at their beck and call. OKAWA, Shumei, stood between them, collaborating with Social Mass Party. They planned to send Lt. Col SUZUKI to MORI of the SEIYUKAI party, conveying their plot confidentially. This was given up, however, by the dissuasion of the said lieutenant colonel, in the interest of the army. It could be guessed that UGAKI was at the back of the plot.
2. An association of research group of Manchurian and Mongolian questions was formed among a group of captains graduated recently from the Army Staff College and the abovementioned Lt. Colonels HASHIMOTO and SHIGEFUJI were its backers.
3. The brains of the Army cannot check these kind of associations because they themselves planned such plots as mentioned above.
4. Recently the Army group has been getting very strong. There is a danger of strong antagonism between the civil and military (authorities) regarding drafting of the budget.

EW 1796

EXCERPT FROM MARQUIS KIDO's DIARY

1931

August 12 (Wed) -- 6 o'clock in the afternoon, I went to Baron HARADA's house. Had dinner with Prince KONOYE and Marquis INOUE. We heard and studied the details of what Mr. HARADA had told me the other day about the under-handed activities of a section of the Army. The affair that made Mr. UGAKI the leader, was that of March 20. (x) certain SHIMIZU of Taikoshu was supplied with thirty bombs (Those were only for use in maneuvers and were almost harmless). However, it was told that the bombs were taken back to the Army a month ago. It is a fact that because the plot was called off and to pay off the men that had been assembled, they collected ¥100,000 from among the Tokugawa nobles.

(x) The above-mentioned fact centering round UGAKI as the leader, is in regard to the occurrence of about March 20, when a certain . . .

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

661-9

1632 H

Aug. 12 - 1931

不才の日記(昭和六年)より抜粋

午後六時ヨリ原田男卿ニ至リ近衛公井上公ト共ニ
夕食御馳走ニリ。過日名田君ヨリ聴取セル陸軍
一部、策動ニ関シ尚詳細ニ事案ヲ聴キ研究ス
宇垣氏ノ中心トセテ、事案ハ三月二十日頃、出来
事ニテ大行社、清水某ニ爆弾(之ハ演習用、モト
ヲ殆トハ危害ヲ興ス。効力ハキヨトシ)三十ヶニ俟
給セトカキ。約一ヶ月前ニ再々軍部ニ取返シタリト云フ又
此計畫ヲ中止スルニ爲集米を人間ノ力ナクニ窮シ
十萬圓ヲ徳川一門ノ華族ヨリ引出セリト云フ又、事案
了

木戸公日記(昭和六年)三、夜半

Doc. 1632 I

Sept 14 - 1931

九月十九日

午後時半總理大臣参内拜謁又 時局に之以上
ナルク擴大セズ我軍、優勢ヲ持シタリ時ニ之ヲ
打切ル方針ニテ進行スルコトナリ

午後六時ヨリ上野無私庵ニ近衛、齋藤、高
木、酒井、佐々木、松平、黒木、園部、諸君ト會食眞
族院問題ヲ議論ス

原田君ヨリ電話ニテ八時半ニ宮内大臣官舎ニ参集
セシメシコトニツキ午後八時半ニ赴ク

宮内大臣侍從長原田君同席原田君ヨリ本日
午後六時半頃總理大臣ニ呼ビテ状況聴取報
告アリ

尚軍部ノ態度ハ中々強硬ニシテ閣議決定事
項ノ実施ニツイテハ出先ニ軍部ニ方針不徹底
ノ嫌ナキニアラズトテ憂慮懊惱ノ様子ナリ
何等カ軍部統制ノ良策ハナキヤ等ノ話
アリ閑院宮ノ努力ヲワスラハスモ一法ナク或ハ

Sen. 179 H

No. 2

木戸公日記(昭和六年)より抜萃

Doc. 1632 I

元老、歸京ヨ来メニハ等、意見ヲ出シガ
余ハ此、難局ニ際シ首相ガ之ガ解決ニ望所
謂他方ヲ願フニハ面白カズ問題ハ空シク幾
度ニテモ亦何日ニテモ閣議ヲ反覆開催シテ
國論、統一ニ努メ内閣自身確固タル決心ヲ示
ス、外途ナシト信ズト主張ス

No. 2,

木戸公日記 (昭和六年) 三校萃

Doc. 1632 I

元老、歸京ヨ来メテハ等、意見无出シガ
余ハ此、難局ニ際シ首相ガ之ガ解決ニ半所
謂他方亦願ナレハ面白カラズ問題ハ空ラウ幾
度ニテモ亦何日ニテモ閣議ヲ反覆開催シテ
國論、統一ニ努メ内閣自身確固タル決心ヲ示
ス、外途ナシト信ズト主張ス

Document No. 1632-J

Excerpt from Marquis Kido's Diary.

1931

Sept 22 (Tues.) -- At 1.30 I visited Mr. HARADA's house again. KONOYE, SAKAI, OKABE, and TAKAGI came there. Discussed and studied various things coming from various directions.

The determination of the Military circles towards Manchuria is so strong that it is feared that orders given by the central authorities may not be thoroughly understood.

The Emperor has expressed satisfaction and approval to the Prime Minister and the Minister of War for the governmental policy to strive not to extend further the Manchurian Incident. However, the Army is reported to have construed and to be indignant, that the Emperor's opinion had been so induced to form by his personal attendants.

In view of such circumstances, it was decided among us that the Emperor had better not say anything further about the Manchurian policy, unless he is necessitated to do so, and that the GENRO (Meaning Prince SAIONJI) against whom the Army harbors antipathy, had better not make a trip to Tokyo unless there is an important change in the situation, because it would intensify the militarist's antipathy.

EXD. 179-J

22

Document No. 1632-I

Excerpt from Marquis Kido's Diary.

1931

Sept. 19 - At 1.30 the Prime Minister went to see the Emperor. I was told that our Army would not try to enlarge the situation but would stop any further action when it found itself in an advantageous position.

A telephone call came from Mr. HARADA telling me to meet at the official residence of the Minister of the Imperial Household, at 8.30.

The Minister of the Imperial Household, the Grand Chamberlain and Mr. HARADA were there. Mr. HARADA reported that he was called by the Prime Minister at about 6.30 and that he was asked about the state of affairs. He said that the Army's attitude was very strong. He added that in regard to the policies decided upon by the cabinet, the Premier seemed to be worrying because the Army was not driving it home thoroughly. The Premier, therefore, wanted to find the best way for controlling the Army. Some said that it might be best to ask for Prince KAN-IN's help, and the others said that they should ask the "GENRO" to stay in Tokyo. But I told them that the Premier should not depend on others in the solution of this situation at this critical time. I emphasized that there was no other alternative but for the cabinet to hold meetings repeatedly and for days, even if futile, and to indicate a firm opinion of its own for the unification of national opinion.

h. 149-f

Doc. 1632 K

木戸公日記(昭和六年)三校章

午後二時ヨリ霞山會館ニ於テ新聞記者連ト
、茶話會アリ出席者林陸軍省整備局長ヨ
リ今回、事件、經過ヲ聽ク所心、鉄道爆破、
詳細ナル情況不明ニシテ之ヲ質問セルニ未ダ報告
到着セズト答ヘテ誠ニ奇怪至極ナリ甚上ニ
不純ナル動機ヲ云々スルモ意外ニ多ク折柄誠
ニ遺憾ナリ

Ex. 117-K

dec 1632 L

Sept 29- 1931

木戸公日記(昭和六年)より抜粋

九月二十九日

午前九時内大臣ヲ宮邸ニ訪問昨夜原田ヨリ聴取
タル參謀總長・首相ニ対スル申入即チ今後或ハ長
江筋ニ至兵場合等モ豫想ニ得ザルニ至兵場合
統帥權問題ハ再ヒ惹起ガレ得統帥權ノ全動
ニシテ政府ニ於テ干渉セザル様ニシタリ件ヲ中心ニ時事
問題ヲ報告ス

木戸公日記(昭和六年) 牧野

四時三原田君ヲ訪問近衛君、白鳥君モ来訪
軍部、陰謀ニツキ話ヲ持テ相談。陸軍中
堅分子、結束頗ル強ク昭和二年頃ヨリ、計画ニ
テ政黨ヲ打破シ一種、ディクテーターシップニヨリ國
政ヲ処理セムト、計画ナルガ如ク實ニ容易ナラザル
問題ナリ而シテ此問題、現任、政治家連、
到底リアライズ出来ソウモナク結局之ニ對スル方策
、頗ル困難ナリ兎モ角モ如此計画モ未嘗得ルヲ
ラバ國、根幹ヲ害スルモノナク且ツ餘計ナク
、ナキ稱善道スル、云アリト思フ真ニ困難ナリ。

Gr. 179-M

14 32:14
Oct 5- 1931

木戸公日記(昭和六年)ヨリ抜粋

午後四時半近衛公ト共ニ一木戸内大臣官
舎ニ訪問軍部、硬化策謀等ニツキ情報ヲ話
シ善処ヲ希望ス。

Document No. 1632-N

Excerpt from Marquis Kido's Diary

1931

Oct. 5 (Mon.) -- At 4.30 I visited Minister of the Imperial Household ICHIKI, at his official residence with Prince KONOYE. We discussed the Army's stubbornness and its intrigues. We gave him all information available and asked him to think up the best solution to this matter.

179-16

16320
Oct. 4 - 1931

木戸公日記(昭和六年)ヨリ抜萃

總理の時局、憂慮スベキ事情ニ以内大臣
ニ話シ多シ模稜ナリ 總理、滿洲問題、交
渉相手方ニハ軍部ト正面衝突スルノ
虞アルトテ最モ憂慮セル様子ナリ

EXH # 177-P

34

Document No. 1632-Q

Excerpt from Marquis Kido's Diary.

1931

October 14 (Wed.) -- At noon I went to Count Tadamasa SAKAI's house and had a conference with Masatoku YASUOKA, Chokei OKABE, Manabu MATSUMOTO, Shigeru YOSHIDA, and Fumio GOTO regarding the current problems. According to Mr. YASUOKA, the plots of the Army are progressing rapidly and students and Ronins are participating in it. Something must be done regarding this matter, he said. Our opinion was that Shashokukai /TN. an association/ which had been previously planned by YASUOKA and others, should be materialized as a permanent counter measure.

Ex. 109-P

1632 Q

Oct 14-1931

木下公日記(昭和六年)十月夜半

正午酒井伯(忠正)邸に至り、岡田正造、岡田部長
景松、本字、吉田茂、後藤文夫、諸君と食し、食
御馳走なり。時事、向題ヲ協議ス。岡田氏、意見
ニシテ、最近軍部、策謀ハ益々盛ニシテ、之ニ浪人學
生等ヲ目ニ目ニ加ヘリ、ナリ。何トカ対策ヲ講ずルベカラズ
ト云フナリ。同氏等、豫テ計畫スル社稷會、恒々恒
久的、対策トシテ實現スル、要アリト云フニ一致ス。

4. 199-Q

1632 R
Oct 15-1931

木ヤ公日記(昭和六年)ヨリ抜粋

林局長、假定、問題ト云フ前提デハ、ソダケ結局、
満洲問題、解決、余リ、長カスルハ、軍、統制規律
、上カウ見テモ不得策ニシテ、早急^の解決ヲ要スルニ
之ガ為ニハ、満洲ニ新政权ヲ樹立セシム、要アリ、而シテ
今日中興部ニ於テ之ガ樹立運動ニ暗黙、諒解ヲ與
ス、直ニ實現スルコトヲ得ニト云フ調子ニテ、暗々、中
軍部ハ依然トシテ満洲ニ新政权ヲ樹立セシム、意
図ヲ有スルコトヲ示シタ

1632Q

Oct 14-1934

水戸公日記(昭和三十四年)より抜粋

正午酒井伯(恵正)邸に至り、安岡正篤氏、同部長景
松本孝、吉田茂、後藤文夫、諸君と会し、昼食、御馳
走ニナリ、時局問題ヲ協議ス、安岡氏、意見ヨリ、最近
軍部ノ策謀、益々盛ニナリ之ニ浪人学生等モ目ヨリ加
ハリツツアリ何トカ、対策ヲ講ゼサルヘカラスト云フニアリ、
同氏等、豫メ計畫セル社稷会、如キハ恒々的、対策ト
シテ實現スルノ要アリト、フ上ニ一致ス。

1931

September 21 (Mon.) -- At 9.30 I went to the office. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal came to Tokyo last night. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, the Grand Chamberlain and Vice-Grand Chamberlain, the head of the Army Aide-de-camp and I gathered in the room of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and conferred about the China and Manchukuo conflict.

Baron HARADA telephoned me from Kyoto asking if there were any further developments in the situation, and suggested that if the Emperor were to call Prince KAN-IN, we would discuss thoroughly the Prince's answer to the Emperor. HARADA 'phoned me again that evening. He transmitted Prince SAIONJI's words to be cautious about his (KANAYA) answer when KANAYA, the Chief of the General Staff would go to see the Emperor to explain why the Korean Army had advanced into Manchukuo without the Emperor's sanction.

At 7.30 p.m. after dinner, I visited the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal at his official residence and transmitted HARADA's telephonic message. On my way home, I stopped at TAKEUCHI's house. But I could not see him, as he was on a business trip.